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South Africa: In Need of a Federal
Constitution for Its Minority Peoples
HERCULES BOOYSEN*
I. INTRODUCrION
In 1996, South Africa passed the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Act 108 (1996 Constitution).1 The 1996 Constitu-
tion purports to create a united nation despite South Africa's ra-
cial and cultural diversity.2 It further vows to establish a demo-
cratic society that embodies social justice and fundamental human
rights. 3 The 1996 Constitution's recognition of liberty and democ-
racy can facilitate a just and fair society, but only in a nation with a
homogenous population and a dominant language and culture.
The problem in South Africa, however, is the nation has always
been, is currently, and will likely remain ethnically, culturally, and
linguistically diverse.
This Article argues the 1996 Constitution will fail in bringing
about a fair and equal South Africa. In fact, with its failure to
provide for the right of self-determination and other minority
rights, the 1996 Constitution may achieve the opposite effect-a
state of total oppression, or perhaps even political violence. Part
II of this Article traces South Africa's Constitutional history and
reviews the past status of minority rights. Part III discusses legal
protection as available to minorities under international and South
African Law. Part IV analyzes relevant portions of the 1996 Con-
stitution and shows its inefficacy in dealing with South Africa's di-
verse population. Finally, this Article concludes that the 1996
Constitution cannot successfully curb and eliminate the political
* Professor, Department of Constitutional and Public International Law, University
of South Africa.
1. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996).
2. See id. pmbl.
3. See id.
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violence in South Africa without accommodating the right of self-
determination. Without this right, violence and racism will con-
tinue to plague South African society.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Overview
Since its founding in 1910, South Africa has had five different
Constitutions: the South Africa Act of 1909 (1909 Act), consid-
ered the founding Constitution;4 the Republican Constitution of,
1961, which made South Africa a "republic"; 5 the Constitution of
1983, which brought people of Indian and mixed ancestry into the
constitutional process;6 the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993
(1993 Interim Constitution), which paved the way for universal
suffrage; 7 and most recently the 1996 Constitution.8
To fulfill their nationalistic aspirations, each of these consti-
tutions have endeavored to bring about unity among the different
people of South Africa. The preamble to the 1909 Act proclaimed
its desire to unify the former Boer Republics, the Transvaal and
the Orange Free State, with the British Colonies, the Natal and
Cape Colony, for the welfare and future progress of South Africa.9
The 1961 Republican Constitution's preamble indicated the ne-
cessity of unity.10 Likewise, the 1983 Constitution sought to guar-
antee human dignity, freedom, and the right of self-
determination.1 1 Nevertheless, these principles remain unrealized
ideals, or perhaps not all the people of South Africa believed in
these ideals or shared in their vision. Not one of these three con-
4. See S. AFR. CONST. (South Africa Act, 1909); see also GRETCHEN CARPENTER,
INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 198 (1987)..
5. See CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 218-19; see also J.P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT
& MARINUS WIECHERS, STAATSREG 248 (1967).
6. See CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 278-80, 287; see also HERCULES BOOYSEN &
D.H. VAN WYK, DIE 83 GRONDWET 39 (1984).
7. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993).
8. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996).
9. See S. AFR. CONST. (South Africa Act, 1909) pmbl.; VAN THEMAAT &
WIECHERS, supra note 5, at 232; CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 197-98 (describing the es-
tablishment of the Union of South Africa).
10. See CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 218.
11. See id.
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stitutions was remotely successful in uniting the different groups in
South Africa. How could they in light of the South African popu-
lation's heterogeneous nature?
B. Rise of the Afrikaners and Centralized Government
When the 1909 Act successfully united the British colonies
with the Boer Republics, only eight years had lapsed since the
British Empire, with its two South African colonies, waged a
bloody war against the two Boer Republics. 1
2
Once united, the more numerous Afrikaners, or Boers, 13 as-
serted their power and began to mold the state to their ideologies
through authoritative means. 14 The Afrikaners used the Westmin-,
ster (British) controlled constitution, which granted them parlia-
ment sovereignty to further consolidate their hegemony. 15 Thus,
Afrikaners retained most, if not all, political control.
South African academics recognize that a federal system with
a power division between the central and regional governments
would have provided better protection to other population
groups, 16 such as the English-speaking whites in Natal, or blacks,
who at this stage were excluded from the constitutional process in
every colony, except the Cape Colony. 17 Both the 1961 Republi-
can Constitution and the 1983 Constitution failed to introduce any
form of territorial federalism into the South African constitutional
regime. The trend was towards centralization of power. 18
12. See JOHN DUGARD INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE
334-35 (1994).
13. Boers and Afrikaners denote the same people. Both groups' ancestors are de-
scendants from the Netherlands and other European countries and both groups speak
Afrikaans, a language derived from Dutch. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DiC-
TIONARY 37,246 (1986).
14. See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER
27-28 (1978) (quoting Professor Leonard Thompson).
15. See id. at 28.
16. See id. (quoting Professor Leonard Thompson).
17. See id. at 29; see also CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 402.
18. See also CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 285.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
C. Devolution of Power and the Homeland Policy19
A devolution of power did occur in one limited respect, how-
ever, before 1994, when the 1993 Interim Constitution became ef-
fective. 20 When the National Party came into power in 1948, it
implemented apartheid that segregated whites and other groups,
and divided different black ethnic groups in South Africa into
separate homelands.21 The homeland authorities received particu-
lar legislative and executive power that depended upon the home-
land authorities' developmental stage,22 until some homelands like
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei received de jure in-
dependence from South Africa.23
The homelands never formed a federation, or even a confed-
eration, with the rest of South Africa. They never had any repre-
sentatives in Parliament, the highest South African legislative
authority. There was no denuarcation between South African and
homeland authorities with respect to concurrent and exclusive
legislative powers, a characteristic of federal constitutions. 24
Homelands were regarded as territories in the process of becoming
independent from South Africa, not as organs of the South African
19. Devolution indicates a transfer in power, leading to a local government regime.
It is also a type of political decentralization. See id. at 400.
20. See generally S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993).
21. See CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 403 (discussing the constitutional process creat-
ing black homelands with,"due regard for black law and custom...."); see also MARINUS
WIECHERS & J.P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, STAATSREG 502 (1981).
22. See CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 402.
23. See Hercules Booysen et al., Comments on the Independence and Constitution of
Transkei, 2 S. AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 1 (1976) ("The South African Status of the Tran-
skei Act, 1976, declares Transkei a sovereign independent state."); Marinus Wiechers &
Dawid van Wyk, The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution 1977, 3 S. AFR. Y.B. OF
INT'L LAW 85, 85 (1977) ("On 6 December 1977 Bophuthatswana... became ... the sec-
ond independent homeland."); Gretchen Carpenter, The Independence of Venda, 5 S.
AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 40, 40 (1979) ("On September 13, 1979 Venda.... opt[ed] for
full independence and a republican form of government."); G. Carpenter, Variation of a
Theme-The Independence of Ciskei, 7 S. AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 83, 83 (1981) ("The
independent republic of Ciskei came into being on 4 December 1981."); THE CON-
STITUTIONS OF TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA, VENDA AND CISKEI. 1-20 (M.P. Vorster
et al. eds., 1985) (discussing the process to grant independence to black territories).
24. See KARL DOEHRING, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE-EINE SYSTEMATISCHE
DARSTELLUNG 166-67 (1991); Yoram Dinstein, The Degree of Self-Rule of Minorities in
Unitarian and Federal States, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221,
222 (Catherine Br6lmann et al. eds., 1993) (describing the characteristics of a federation).
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state.25 Part of the overriding homeland policy was to exclude
blacks from the South African political process. 26 This resulted in
discrediting the entire homeland policy in the eyes of not only
South African blacks, but the international community at large.
If a proper homeland federation, or even a confederation, had
been founded among the different homelands and the rest of
South Africa, a constitutional structure that reflected South Af-
rica's cultural and ethnic diversities would have been created. Yet,
despite academic discussion suggesting a homeland confedera-
tion,27 this possibility was never realized.
D. 1993 Interim Constitution28
1. Provinces
The 1993 Interim Constitution chose to ignore South Afri-
can's cultural and ethnic realities. Instead, it created a new order,
which emphasized one single state, 29 universal suffrage, 30 human
rights, 31 and overall democracy. The Interim Constitution ac-
knowledged the former dependent and independent homelands as
part of South Africa.32 It established nine provinces, of which at
least four, Natal, Northern Transvaal, North-West and Eastern
Cape, substantially corresponded with former homelands. 33 Tra-
ditional Afrikaner districts were included in those provinces that
substantially corresponded with former black homelands. 34 Alter-
natively, traditional Afrikaner provinces included parts of black
25. See Republic of South Africa v. Government of KwaZulu 1983 (1) SA 164, 205
(A).
26. See Wiechers & van Wyk, supra note 23; In re Certification of the Constitution of
the RSA, 1996 (4) SA 744, 777 (CC); see also DUGARD, supra note 12, at 103.
27. See Francois Venter, Perspectives on the Constitutions of Transkei, Bophuthat-
swana, Venda and Ciskei, in CONSTITUTIONS OF TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA, VENDA
AND CISKEI, supra note 23, at 12.
28. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993).
29. See id. ch. 1, § 1,
30. See id. ch. 2, § 6.
31. See id. ch. 3, §§ 7-35.
32. See id. sched. 1.
33. See id.
34. See id. For example, the Ellisras and Warmbad districts were included in the
Northern Transvaal Province and districts such as Aberdeen, Graaff-Reinet, and Jan-
senville were included in the Eastern Cape Province. See id.
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homelands.35 Afrikaner cities, like Pretoria, the former Boer capi-
tal of the Transvaal Republic, were grouped in the same province
with more populous black cities, such as Soweto.36
The new territorial demarcation deprived Afrikaners in the
former Boer Republics of any political control over themselves or
their territories. They became marginalized, insignificant, and
scattered minorities. Only in the Western Cape provinces did Af-




Under the 1993 Interim Constitution, Parliamentary legisla-
tion generally prevailed over provincial law.38 While the provinces
had concurrent legislative power with Parliament, 39 the provinces
lacked any exclusive powers because-the Interim Constitution fol-
lowed the South African tradition of a strong centralized national
legislature.40 The Constitution, however, abolished Parliament's
supremacy by making the Constitution the supreme law of the Re-
public41 and by binding Parliament to a fundamental human rights
bill. 42 The 1993 Constitution also provided for power sharing be-
tween political parties at national and provincial levels.43 This
form of power sharing was unrealistic because although a majority
political party was forced into a coalition with a minority party, the
majority did not need another party to govern effectively. Fur-
thermore, this form of power sharing could not serve group and
special geographical interests.
As expected, the Afrikaners in the former Boer Republics did
35. See id. For example, Thaba Nchu was included in the Orange Free State Prov-
ince. See id.
36. Together with other cities, Pretoria and Soweto comprise the province Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-vereeniging. See id.
37. See generally Mary Braid, Afrikaans Struggles to Shake Off the Taint of Apartheid,
INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 22, 1996, at 10.
38. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) ch. 9, § 126(3).
39. See id. ch. 9, § 126(1), sched. 6. These matters included agriculture, casinos, cul-
tural affairs, education, health services, housing, roads, and welfare services. See id.
40. See CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 285.
41. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) ch. 1, § 4(1)-(2).
42. See id. ch. 3, § 7(1).
43. See id. ch. 6, §§ 84(1), 88(2), ch. 9, § 149(2).
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not enthusiastically greet the 1993 Interim Constitution. To avoid
the possibility of a civil war, the Afrikanervolksfront, representing
Afrikaners striving for self-determination, and the African Na-
tional Congress, the predominantly black party, signed an agree-
ment to avoid a civil war. The agreement was concluded on De-
cember 21, 1993, before the African National Congress was voted
into power in the April 27, 1994 general elections. The agreement
recognized various forms of self-determination, especially the es-
tablishment of territorial entities with various degrees of auton-
omy.
In 1994, agreements between South Africa's political parties
resulted in an amendment to the Interim Constitution.44 This
amendment provided for finalizing the Provinces' borders in es-
tablishing a Volkstaat, an independent state for Afrikaners.45 The
amendment authorized a Volkstaat to be a territorial entity to ac-
commodate Afrikaners' right to self-determination. 46
Furthermore, the amendment also established a Volkstaat
Council47 to make proposals to the Constitutional Assembly.48
The Council's functions entailed proposing how to establish an
Afrikaner Volkstaat. 49 In 1995, the Volkstaat Council recom-
mended the introduction of a federated provincial system to the
Constitutional Assembly.50 It marked a specific territory within
the Boer Republics' historical boundaries where Afrikaners com-
prised the majority of the population 51 and recommended that this
area be a constituent state within South Africa. 52 The total area of
the specified territory constituted only 3.2% of the Republic of
South Africa.53 The Council also recommended the establishment
of certain autonomous areas with limited legislative and executive
44. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993), amended by S. AFR. CONST. (Act 2 of
1994) [hereinafter South Africa Act of 1994].
45. See id. ch. llA, § 184B(3), amended by South Africa Act of 1994 § 9.
46. See id. sched. 4, const. princ. XXXIV.
47. See id. ch. IlA, § 184A(1).
48. See id. ch. 11A, § 184B(1)(c).
49. See id.
50. See FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE VOLKSTAAT COUNCIL, ch. 4, para. 4.4, at 24
(1995).
51. See id. ch. 5 at 29.
52. See id. ch. 4, para. 4.4.2.1, at 25.
53. See id. ch. 5, para. 5.1.4.1, at 35.
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powers. 54
The Volkstaat Council's proposals for a federated South Af-
rica were modeled after the Federal Republic of Germany's Basic
Law.55 The Constitutional Assembly, however, ignored these pro-
posals, thereby raising questions as to the bona fide intentions of
the Constitutional Assembly, the African National Congress, and
the validity of the new 1996 Constitution regarding international
law and its legitimacy vis-d-vis the Afrikaners.
E. 1996 Constitution
The 1993 Interim Constitution was the product of negotiations
between South Africa's former government and political parties,
including the African National Congress. The Constitutional As-
sembly, responsible for drafting the new South African Constitu-
tion, had to comply with the Constitutional principles in the 1993
Interim Constitution that were regarded as a "solemn pact" be-
tween the negotiating parties.56
Initially, the Constitutional Court found certain aspects of the
1996 Constitution violated the Constitutional Principles.57 Follow-
ing a drafting process that lasted more than two years, 58 -the 1996
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa59 finally became ef-
fective.
The preamble to the 1996 South African Constitution es-
pouses a united South Africa despite its diversity.60 The preamble
professes to establish a society based on democratic values, social
justice, and fundamental human rights.61 It fails, however, to ac-
count for South Africa's multi-cultural society and multi-ethnic
population. 62 Had South Africa boasted a homogeneous popula-
54. See id. ch. 5 at 35.
55. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] (F.R.G.); see FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE
VOLKSTAAT COUNCIL, supra note 50, para 11.26-11.2.12.2, at 69-73.
56. See S. AFR. CONST (Act 200 of 1993) pmbl.; In re Certification of the Constitution
of the RSA, 1996 (4) 744, 780 (CC).
57. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 (4) SA 744,780 (CC).
58. Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996, Case CCT 37/96, para. 205, 1997 (2) SA 162 (CC).
59. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996).
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tion with a clear majority in language and culture, the explicit rec-
ognition of the liberal democratic values embodied in the pream-
ble would be sufficient to implement a democratic South Africa.
The inherent conflict embodied in the 1996 Constitution's basic
suppositions63 are apparent in the Constitution's Founding Provi-
sions.64 Section 1 declares that South Africa is one sovereign state
but under section 6(1), this one unified sovereignty has eleven of-
ficial languages. 65 South Africa may be declared one sovereign
state de jure, but its own Founding Principles recognize that it
consists of various peoples, each with their own language and tra-
dition.
Under the 1996 Constitution, the South African government
consists of national, provincial, and local spheres that are distinc-
tive, interdependent, and interrelated.66 Parliament is the highest
legislative body and consists of the National Assembly, which is
elected by the general population,67 and the National Council of
Provinces,68 which consists of representatives from the provinces. 69
Parliament, as represented by the National Assembly, may
legislate on any matter.70 Parliament and the provinces share con-
current jurisdiction in certain defined areas.71 Except in certain
instances, national legislation prevails over provincial legislation. 72 -
Even in areas where provinces retain exclusive jurisdiction,73 Par-
liament may intervene for the sake of national security, economic
unity, and essential national standards. 74 It may also intervene to
prevent unreasonable action, 75 a concept not yet defined by the
provinces. Despite, the 1993 Constitutional Principle that prov-
63. See id. ch. 1, § 1.
64. See id. ch. 1.
65. See id. ch. 1, § 6.
66. See id. ch. 3, § 40(1).
67. See id. ch. 4, §§ 42(3), 46(1).
68. See id. ch. 4, § 42(1).
69. See id. ch. 4, § 42(4).
70. See id. ch. 4, § 44(1)(a)(ii).
71. See id. ch. 4, § 44(1)(b), sched. 4.
72. See id. ch. 6, § 146.
73. See id. sched. 5.
74. See id. ch. 4, § 44.
75. See id. ch. 4, § 44(2).
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inces must have exclusive powers, 76 no such power exists in the
1996 Constitution. Instead, legislative and executive powers are
centralized in Parliament.
The 1996 Constitution provides for nine Provinces77 with lim-
ited, individual executive 78 and legislative powers.79 They are ex-
clusive executive and legislative powers encompassing relatively
trivial matters.8
0
In an attempt to reflect South Africa's cultural and ethnic di-
versity, the 1996 Constitution provides for the Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities.81 Although the Commission is subject to
constitutional limitations,82 it is empowered and regulated by na-
tional legislation. 83 The Commission's objectives are: (1) to pro-
mote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic
communities; (2) to promote and develop unity among these
communities; and (3) to recommend the establishment of cultural
councils for these communities. 84 The Commission is not founded
on the recognition of any minority groups' rights, although the ex-
istence of such rights is presumed.
Under the 1996 Constitution, the Bill of Right§ prohibits un-
fair discrimination based on ethnic origin, culture, or language. 85
76. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) sched. 4, const. princ. XIX. In In re Certifi-
cation of the Constitution of the RSA, the Constitutional Court decided this principle was
qualified by other Constitutional Principles and thus "the occasion for intervention by
Parliament is likely to be limited." In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA,
1996 (4) SA 849, 850. The Court's reasoning, however, ignores the clear language of
Constitutional Principle XIX, which states that powers and functions at the provincial
level shall include exclusive powers. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) sched. 4,
const. princ. XIX.
77. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 6, § 103(1). Provincial boundaries are
the same as existed under the 1993 Interim Constitution. See id. ch. 6, § 103(2).
78. See id. ch. 6, § 125(1).
79. See id. ch. 6, § 104(1).
80. See id. sched. 5. These relatively trivial matters include abattoirs, ambulance
services, archives, libraries, liquor licenses, museums, provincial recreation and amenities,
provincial sports, roads, and veterinary services. See id.
81. See id. ch. 9, § 181(1)(c).
82. See id. ch. 9, § 181(2).
83. See id. ch. 9, § 185(2).
84. See id. ch. 9, § 185(1)(c).
85. See id. ch. 2, § 9(3).
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The Bill of Rights also protects individual rights, including: the
right to receive education in the official language of choice where
it is reasonably practicable; 86 the right to establish and maintain, at
one's own expense, educational institutions; 87 the right to use the
language and participate in the culture of one's choice;88 and the
right of persons belonging to a cultural, religious, or linguistic
community not to be denied the right to enjoy their culture, relig-
ion, and language and the right to form cultural, religious and lin-
guistic associations. 89 These rights must be interpreted, however,
in conjunction with international law.
90
The 1996 Constitution also explicitly refers to the right of
self-determination. "The right of the South African people as a
whole to self-determination does not preclude . . . recognition of
the right of self-determination" to any individual community
sharing a common cultural and linguistic heritage.91 This provision
reenacts the 1993 Interim Constitutional Principle allowing the es-
tablishment of territorial entities in which people like the Afrikan-
ers could enjoy self-determination. 92 These territorial entities,
however, were never actually formed.
The significance of Principle XXXIV is uncertain. Even
without the reenactment, Parliament may amend the Constitution
to implement territorial self-determination for any cultural com-
munity. The newly prescribed amendment procedure is, however,
cumbersome where provincial boundaries, powers, functions, or
institutions are affected. If territorial self-determination is to be
implemented for any community on a provincial level, the difficult
amendment process would inevitably ensue.
Amending the Constitution requires a bill to pass in the Na-
tional Assembly, with supporting votes from at least two thirds of
its members, and in the National Council of Provinces, with sup-
porting votes from at least six provinces. 93 Furthermore, the spe-
86. See id. ch. 2, § 29(2).
87. See id. ch. 2, § 29(3).
88. See id. ch. 2, § 30.
89. See id. ch. 2, § 31(1).
90. See id. ch. 2, § 39(1)(b).
91. Id. ch. 14, § 235.
92. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) sched. 4, const. princ. XXXIV.
93. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 4, § 74(1).
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cific province whose territory will be affected by the amendment
must also approve the bill. 94 The implementation of territorial
self-determination under the 1996 Constitution is, therefore, much
more difficult than it was under the 1993 Interim Constitution. A
possible purpose for the reenactment was to enable Parliament to
implement territorial self-determination, on a provincial level,
while circumventing the cumbersome amendment procedure.
Parliament may establish local governments 95 and assign
powers to them.96 Therefore, Parliament could implement terri-
torial self-determination on a local government level. To achieve
this, the reenactment of the Principle XXXIV was unnecessary.
III. LEGAL EVALUATION OF MINORITY PROTECTION
A. International Law: The Right of Self-Determination
1. Background
Ten years ago, the South African Constitution would have
admirably exemplified the protection of human and minority
rights. Since the fall of communism, however, this millennium's
last decade has experienced a paradigm shift in international law
concerning the protection of minority rights. The concept that the
state, as an all embracing body to which all inhabitants and citizens
pledge loyalty, has come under severe strain. Thomas M. Franck
noted that "[t]he idea of the state as a multicommunal civil society
is thus challenged from below by schismatic movements. ' 97 In a
homogeneous society, the state is the natural representative of all
its inhabitants. In a heterogeneous society, however, the state may
be unable to achieve universal representation. 98 This implies that
minority groups need the right to represent themselves. 99 Al-
94. See id. ch. 4, § 74(3).
95. See id. ch. 7, § 155(2)(a).
96. See id. ch. 7, § 156(1)(b).
97. See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in
Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 359, 360 (1996).
98. See Henry Schermers, The Bond Between Man and State, in RECHT ZWISCHEN
UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG-FESTSCHRIFr FOR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 187, 188
(Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995).
99. See Adrien-Claude Zoller, International Representation of Peoples and Minorities,
in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 301, 305 (Catherine Br6lmann et
[Vol. 19:789800
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though its details may be unclear, the minority right to self-
determination clearly exists, but is no longer recognized as existing
only in a typical colonial situation.100 The minority right to self-
determination also exists in, and against, recognized states. Prin-
ciples applicable to colonies could, and thus should, also apply to
such minorities.
2. Linguistic and Cultural Rights
Although the existence of the right to self-determination is
generally recognized, its juridical contents are often uncertain.
Various forms of self-determination have been identified.101 Ini-
tially, minority groups were accorded special cultural and linguistic
rights. 102 If recognition of these rights effectively satisfied the mi-
norities' yearning for self-determination, recognizing any other
form of self-determination would be unnecessary. This, however,
was not the case. The mere protection of the individual through
recognition of specific human rights inadequately protects the in-
dividual as a member of a group. 103 The state should also promote
retention by minority groups of their unique group characteris-
tics.104
3. Territorial Autonomy
Territorial autonomy is also recognized as a form of self-
determination in areas where a majority of inhabitants belong to a
distinct ethnic or linguistic minority. 105  This form of self-
al. eds., 1993).
100. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Editorial Comment, The Degrees of Self-
Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 304, 305 (1994).
101. See id. at 307.
102. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179; U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Dec. 18, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 911 (1993).
103. See Natan Lerner, The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law, in
PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 81 (Catherine Brolmann et al
eds., 1993).
104. See Thilo Marauhn, Der Status von Minderheiten im Erziehungswesen und im
Medienrecht, in DAS MINDERHEITENRECHT EUROPAISCHER STAATEN 410, 450 (Jochen
Abr. Frowein et al. eds., 1994).
105. See Kirgis, supra note 100, at 307; Oscar Schachter, Micronationalism and Seces-
sion, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG 179, 182 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al.
eds., 1995).
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determination is expressed in federal and confederal state struc-
tures. 106 The relationship between cultural self-determination and
autonomous territorial self-determination is not always clear.
Does the right to autonomous territorial self-determination super-
sede the right to cultural self-determination? Is the granting of
cultural self-determination a realization of the right of self-
determination? Or does the right to autonomous territorial self-
determination exist even though a state has already granted a mi-
nority group the right to cultural self-determination? Is there a
right to autonomous self-determination?
Numerous scholars and academics have attempted to explore
these issues. Daniel Thiirer discusses this problem, but stops short
of drawing the logical conclusion that such a right exists.107 He
prefers to call it a principle of purpose, a zielprinzip.108 Further,
Steven R. Ratner implies there is a right to territorial self-
determination that includes the right to autonomous territorial
self-determination. According to Ratner, international law ac-
cepts "at a minimum that long-term inhabitants of a territory-have
rights that can override the claims of Governments,"1 09 and that
such people "are entitled to a special voice in the strategy for in-
ternal self-determination." 110 Patrick Thornberry speaks of a
right of participation that may lead to autonomous structures.111
In addition, according to Hurst Hannum:
[O]ne may not recognize a "right" to a particular form of de-
volved or federal political structure, opposition to such de-
mands by the central government should be founded on a dem-
onstration that the regional or minority demands are
106. See Schachter, supra note 105, at 182.
107. See Daniel Thiirer, Region und Minderheitenschutz-Aufbauelemente Einer Eu-
ropaischen Architektur?, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG 1337, 1358
(Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995); see also Otto Kimminich, A "Federal" Right of Self-
Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 83, 100 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993).
108. See Thurer, supra note 107, at 1358.
109. Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New
States, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 590, 615 (1996).
110. Id. at 615-16.
111. See Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination
with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101, 134
(Christian Tomuschat ed. 1993).
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unreasonable or are being met in practice, rather than on ir-
relevant incantations of state sovereignty or even majority
rule.1
12
Or, arguably, on slogans of nation-building.
4. Form of Self-Determination-Who Decides?
The notion of self-determination implies that the subject of
this right, the minority people, must decide for themselves the
form of self-determination. 113 The United Nations Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
(Colonial Independence Declaration) 114 recognizes that by virtue
of their right to self-determination, people determine their politi-
cal status and freely pursue their political development. 115 A gov-
ernment cannot force upon them an unwanted form of self-
determination. The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(Friendly Relations Declaration) 116 also recognizes that the right
to self-determination includes the right to choose the form of self-
determination. 117 "[A]ll peoples have the right freely to deter-
mine, without external interference, their political status" and the
''emergence into any ... political status freely determined by a
people" constitutes implementation of the right to self-
determination.118
112. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION-THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 474 (1990).
113. See Conor Cruise O'Brien, What Rights Should Minorities Have?, in MINORITIES:
A QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11, 13 (Ben Whitaker ed., 1984); Kimminich, supra note
107, at 94.
114. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
People, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/L.323 (1960) reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 188 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1974) [hereinafter Colo-
nial Independence Declaration].
115. Seeid. at 189.
116. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970) reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 338 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1976) [hereinafter
Friendly Relations Declaration ].
117. See id. at 340.
118. Id. at 340,341.
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Contemporary international law recognizes that the ideal way
to constitutionally protect minorities is to accommodate them in
federal structures. 119 Certain requirements are, however, sug-
gested for the implementation of territorial autonomy. The minor-
ity group should be concentrated in a well demarcated territory, in
which its members constitute the majority. 120 Federal structures
are important for the protection of minorities because in such a
system the federal government and the constituent state are sub-
ordinate to the Constitution, not to each other.121 Although a fed-
eral system cannot solve all the problems concerning minorities
rights, 122 it can allow territorial autonomy without dismembering
the state.
5. Secession
Secession can also achieve self-determination. The Colonial
Independence Declaration 123 and the Friendly Relations Declara-
tion124 both recognize this idea. The implementation of self-
determination by secession is conditional, however. The commu-
nity seeking secession must have been subjected to economical and
political discrimination. Also, the central government controlling
the community must have rejected reasonable proposals for
autonomy and minority rights. 125
6. State Responsibility
A counterpart to the right of self-determination is state re-
sponsibility. Once the right to self-determination has been estab-
lished, the metropolitan state has a duty to recognize that right and
implement it. The Friendly Relations Declaration -and academic
119. See Jochen Abr. Frowein, Das Recht der Minderheiten als Herausforderung an die
Verfassungsordnung des freien Europa, in DAS MINDERHEITENRECHT EUROPAISCHER
STAATEN, at VIII (Jochen Abr. Frowein et al. eds., 1994); Kimminich, supra note 107, at
98.
120. See Stefan Oeter, Minderheiten im institutionellen Staatsaufbau, in DAS
MINDERHEITENRECHT EUROPAISCHER STAATEN 492, 509 (Jochen Abr. Frowein et al.
eds., 1994).
121. See Dinstein, supra note 24, at 222.
122. See id. at 231.
123. See Colonial Independence Declaration, G.A. Res. 1514,.supra note 114.
124. See Friendly Relations Declaration, G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 116.
125. See Schachter, supra note 105, at 185.
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opinion recognize the state's duty to acknowledge the established
right.126 All states owe this duty to all international community
members. 127 The duties of states that are third parties are unclear,
but arguably every state must refrain from action that deprives
people of their right to self-determination. All states must also
promote the realization of such a right. 128 The metropolitan state
thus, has a more circumscribed role in implementing the right to
self-determination.
The idea that there are degrees of self-determination, or that
self-determination is a variable right and not an absolute one, is
suspect.' 29 This view virtually concludes that so long as a domi-
nated minority has a "good master," they do not have the right to a
specific form of self-determination. This attitude makes the right
a relative one and ignores the very .essence of the right of self-
determination: that people can chose their own status. The sup-
posed degrees of self-determination may be relevant, however, in
gauging the reaction of other states to a self-determination move-
ment, because self-determination issues are not domestic, but in-
ternational. 130 Other states must also decide whether to recognize
new states that emerge from self-determination struggles. Other
states will also have to make judgments, or be prepared to make
judgments, about the legitimacy of the implementation or denial of
a self-determination movement, while still complying with their
duties to refrain from action that deprives people of their right and
to actively promote the realization of such a right.
B. South Africa's Self-Determination Policy
South Africa is a typical African country with borders that
were arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers. Neither the 1993 In-
terim Constitution nor the 1996 Constitution attempted to remedy
this defect. The process of arbitrarily drawing borders, for the
126. See Friendly Relations Declaration, G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 116, at 338-39;
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L.
46, 54 (1992).
127. See Franck, supra note 126, at 54.
128. See Friendly Relations Declaration, G.A. 2625, supra note 116, at 338-39.
129. But see Kirgis, supra note 100, at 308.
130. See Franck, supra note 126, at 54; Trent N. Tappe, Self-Determination in a
Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist
Claims, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255,257 n.10 (1995).
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sake of empowering the ruling 61ite, continues.131 South Africa
denies territorial autonomy to minorities in an attempt to create
democracy. Democracy, or purported democracy, however, can-
not be used to override the principle of minority rights, especially
the right to self-determination. 13
2
One cause of Africa's bloody history is its tendency to central-
ize power and not allow any territorial autonomy.133 The empha-
sis is on nation-building together with denying autonomous terri-
torial self-determination. 134 Africa's history testifies to the failure
of this policy. South Africa has, with its new 1996 Constitution,
simply followed the footsteps of other African countries. The high
principles of democracy and human rights are not a novelty in Af-
rican constitutions. 135  Unfortunately, these principles are rarely
practiced. On the other hand, not even federal systems can guar-
antee African stability.136 Therefore, the question is not which
constitutional system can function properly in the African context,
but what is legally required.
The Constitutional Assembly ignored the agreement between
the African National Congress and representatives of the Afrikan-
ers and ignored the amendments to the 1993 Interim Constitution
that provided for Afrikaner territorial autonomy.137 The Consti-
tutional Court's view that the 1993 Interim Constitution only
131. According to a television broadcast, the ruling African National Congress (ANC)
government plans to change the borders of the North West Province by including the Set-
swana speaking Taung into the Afrikaans speaking Northern Cape because of its dwin-
dling support in the Northern Cape Province. See Television News (television broadcast,
Feb. 18, 1997).
132. See Werner Kaltefleiter, The Function of Self-Determination in the Process of
Nation-Building: The International Experience, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON SELF-DETERMINATION HELD BY THE VOLKSTAAT COUNCIL
22, 34 (1996)
133. See id. at 30.
134. See P.W. Liebenberg, Constitutional Recognition of the Principle of Self-
Determination in International Context, in FOURTH REPORT OF THE VOLKSTAAT
COUNCIL 47 (1996).
135. See BENJAMIN NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA 19
(1982); CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS IN NIGERIA-PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANAMBRA
STATE LAW CONFERENCE 1986,46 (E.I. Nwogugu, ed. 1988).
136. See J.F. Kirsten, Nigeria: A Federation Gone Wrong, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SELF-DETERMINATION HELD BY THE VOLKSTAAT
COUNCIL 129 (1996)..
137. See supra Part II.
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authorized territorial self-determination without embodying any
obligation, in this respect, is unacceptable. 138 To accept such a
view is to accept that the amendments and the agreement are le-
gally ineffective and may be ignored with impunity. Such a con-
clusion militates against jurisprudence. The legal nature, as well as
the binding force of the agreement, is admittedly a difficult juris-
prudential question. The agreement is, however, a result of nego-
tiations between the African National Congress (ANC), professing
to have enjoyed international legal existence as a representative
body,139 and its counterpart, an Afrikaner organization represent-
ing the Afrikaners. The fact that the Constitutional Assembly
never seriously discussed a federal system granting autonomy to
ethnic groups reflects the absence of bona fide intentions on the
part of the Constitutional Assembly and the ANC government.
The violation of the expectations created by both the agreement
and the amendments to the 1993 Interim Constitution must cer-
tainly affect the legitimacy of the new 1996 Constitution in the
eyes of Afrikaners. Bona fides is a general principle of law recog-
nized by international law;140 its violation cannot be without legal
consequences.
The Afrikaners were not the only people with expectations of
self-determination. 141 This was also the case with the Zulus.
14 2
The Volkstaat Council's proposed federal constitution was ig-
nored. Under the international law requirements regarding self-
determination, the ANC government had a duty to heed the mi-
nority groups' requests for the implementation of territorial self-
determination. The fact that the proposals for territorial self-
determination were based on recognized federal constitutional
138. See In Re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA 1996 (4) SA 744, 780 (CC).
139. The ANC accepted, for example, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Addi-
tional Protocol I of 1977 in 1980. See DUGARD, supra note 12, at 334.
140. See ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT-
THEORIE UND PRAXIS ' 601, 645 (1984); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1990); Anthony D'Amato, Good Faith, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 599 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
141. See H.C.G. Robbertze, The History of Afrikaner Self-Determination, in FIFTH
REPORT OF THE VOLKSTAAT COUNCIL (1996) (discussing the Zulus' quest for self-
determination). The Afrikaners clearly fulfill the definition of a community as formu-
lated by the Permanent Court of International Justice. See Greco-Bulgarian Communi-
ties, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 21, July 31, 1930.
142. See Kaltefleiter, supra note 132, at 24.
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principles, made their rejection unreasonable. Both the 1993 In-
terim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution incorporate interna-
tional law into South African law, unless it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions. 143 This implies that the Constitution is
above international law. In view of the absence of the implemen-
tation of territorial self-determination, the Constitution, new or
old, is not in accordance with international law.
IV. CONCLUSION
South Africa's 1996 Constitution discards minority groups'
legitimate and reasonable claims for territorial self-determination.
The Constitution prevents such claims by making the amendment
process difficult and cumbersome. In this respect, it has funda-
mentally changed the South African constitutional scene. All the
constitutional forerunners were flexible, allowing the government
to adapt the policy of self-determination claims. Previously, sim-
ple majorities in Parliament could effectuate change. Previous
governments were thus able to avoid an uncontrollable violent
eruption of self-determination struggles. This advantage does not
exist under the 1996 Constitution. The government can now sup-
press self-determination issues by arguing that the amendment
process cannot accommodate such claims. Minority demand for
self-determination may, therefore, smolder until they reach a criti-
cal boiling point.
Considering certain aspects of the government's policy, it is
clear that despite the human rights and democratic ideals recited
in the 1996 Constitution, the current government is as insensitive
towards the right of self-determination of other people as any
previous government. The government's insensitivity is clearly
evidenced in many of its policies. For example, the government
has deliberately: "cleansed" the civil service of Afrikaners and has
even appointed in their place, blacks who are unable or refuse to
speak Afrikaans to serve Afrikaans cities and regions. The gov-
ernment has also forced Afrikaans speaking universities and
schools to become double medium (using both languages) or only
English speaking, and has allowed traditional Afrikaner commu-
nities to be over-populated, and swamped with non-Afrikaners.
143. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) ch. 15, § 231(4); S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108
of 1996) ch. 14, § 232.
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Finally, the government has grouped different communities to-
gether, with the sole purpose of allowing non-Afrikaners to gov-
ernAfrikaner communities.
Without accommodating the right of self-determination in the
Constitution, the low intensity political violence that is continuing
in South Africa will not end, and may even escalate. This is said
without taking into account the violence that is still permeating
KwaZulu-Natal, the traditional homeland of the Zulu people.

